FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUITDOUG C., individually and on behalf No. 12-15079of his minor child; SPENCER C., aminor child, D.C. No. Plaintiffs-Appellants, 1:11-cv-00441- KSC v.STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF OPINIONEDUCATION ; KATHRYN MATAYOSHI,in her official capacity as ActingSuperintendent of Hawaii PublicSchools, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii Kevin S. Chang, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 16, 2012—Honolulu, Hawaii Filed June 13, 2013 Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Sidney R. Thomas, and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Paez2 DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. SUMMARY* Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Reversing the district court’s judgment, the panel heldthat the Hawaii Department of Education violated theIndividuals with Disabilities Education Act by holding astudent’s annual individualized education program meetingwithout the participation of a parent. The panel held that the Department of Education deniedthe student a free appropriate public education by holding theIEP meeting without the parent even though the parent didnot affirmatively refuse to attend, but rather actively soughtto reschedule the meeting in order to participate. The panelremanded the case for the district court for furtherproceedings regarding the parent’s entitlement toreimbursem*nt of private school tuition. COUNSELKeith H.S. Peck (argued), Honolulu, Hawaii; and Robert E.Badger, Badger Arakaki, LLC, Honolulu, Hawaii, forPlaintiffs-Appellants.David M. Louie, Attorney General, and Michelle M.L. Puu(argued) and Holly T. Shikada, Deputy Attorneys General,Honolulu, Hawaii for Defendants-Appellees. * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It hasbeen prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 3 OPINIONPAEZ, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Doug C., individually and on behalf of his son,Spencer C., appeals the district court’s judgment finding thatthe defendant, the Hawaii Department of Education, did notdeny Spencer a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”),and thus did not violate the Individuals with DisabilitiesEducation Act (“IDEA”), by holding an annual individualizededucation program (“IEP”) meeting without the participationof a parent. Parental participation in the IEP and educationalplacement process is central to the IDEA’s goal of protectingdisabled students’ rights and providing each disabled studentwith a FAPE.
20 U.S.C. § 1400
(d); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176
, 205–06 (1982). We conclude that theDepartment violated the IDEA’s explicit parentalparticipation requirements. The Department held Spencer’sannual IEP meeting without parental participation eventhough Doug C. did not “affirmatively refuse[] to attend,” butrather actively sought to reschedule the meeting in order toparticipate. Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist.,
317 F.3d 1072
, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003), superseded on othergrounds by
20 U.S.C. § 1414
(d)(1)(B). By denying Doug C.the opportunity to participate in the IEP process, theDepartment denied Spencer a FAPE. See
id. at 1079
. Wehave jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291
, and we reverse. The IEP meeting in question changed Spencer’splacement from Horizons Academy, a private specialeducation facility, to the Workplace Readiness Program atMaui High School. Pending the outcome of theseadministrative and judicial review proceedings, Doug C.continued Spencer’s placement at Horizons Academy at his4 DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.own expense. We remand to the district court for furtherproceedings regarding Doug C.’s entitlement toreimbursem*nt of Spencer’s private school tuition. Becausewe conclude that the Department denied Spencer a FAPE,Doug C. is entitled to reimbursem*nt if he can establish that“the private school placement was proper under the Act.”Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter,
510 U.S. 7
, 15(1993). I. Spencer is an 18-year-old student in the Maui District ofthe Hawaii Department of Education.1 He was diagnosedwith autism at age two. As a result of his condition, theDepartment determined that Spencer is eligible to receivespecial education and other related services, and hiseducational rights are protected by the IDEA. Beginning infifth grade, Spencer’s IEP placed him at a private specialeducation facility, Horizons Academy, at the expense of theDepartment of Education. The Department held Spencer’sannual IEP meeting on November 9, 2010 despite Doug C.’sinability to attend the meeting that day. At that meeting, theDepartment changed Spencer’s educational placement,moving him to a program at Maui High School, his localpublic school. The central issue in this case is whether the Department’sefforts to include Doug C. in the November IEP meetingare sufficient to meet the requirements of the IDEA. A closereview of the events leading up to the IEP meeting is 1 Spencer was 15-years-old when the IEP meeting that is the subject ofthis appeal took place. DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 5therefore critical.2 The IEP team and Doug C. first discussedthe annual IEP meeting date during a student support meetingin September 2010.3 Kaleo Waiau, a special educationcoordinator at Maui High School, testified that Doug C. andmembers of the education team all agreed that the IEPmeeting would be held on October 28. Doug C. testified thathe thought that they had only agreed, tentatively, to meetsometime in late October. In any event, Waiau called DougC. on October 22 to confirm the October 28 meeting. DougC. stated that he was unavailable that day, and they settledinstead on either November 4 or 5 (the testimony on which isinconsistent). Doug C. testified that the November date wasalso tentative, subject to checking his calendar andconfirming. The following day, Doug C. called Waiau to lethim know that he was not available on that day, and theysettled firmly on November 9 instead. On the morning of November 9, Doug C. e-mailed Waiauat 7:27 a.m. He explained that he was sick and thereforeunable to attend the IEP meeting. He suggested reschedulingthe meeting for the following week, on either November 16or 17. The annual review deadline for Spencer’s IEP wasSaturday, November 13. According to Waiau, some of themembers of the IEP team were not available on Friday,November 12. Therefore, Waiau offered to reschedule foreither Wednesday, November 10, or Thursday, November 11,accommodating the other members’ schedules while still 2 The facts, drawn from the testimony and other evidence presented ata due process administrative hearing before a state hearing officer, aremostly undisputed. 3 Spencer’s mother apparently found the IEP meetings too stressful toattend.6 DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.holding the meeting before the deadline. Doug C. respondedthat he could possibly participate on either of those days, butcould not definitively commit to either day since he was illand could not guarantee that he would recover in time.Waiau also suggested that Doug C. participate by phone orthe Internet. But Doug C. explained that (1) he wanted to bephysically present at his son’s IEP meeting and (2) he did notfeel physically well enough to participate meaningfullythrough any means that day. Waiau decided to go forward with the meeting onNovember 9 as scheduled. He testified that he had alreadyasked “13 people on three separate occasions to change theirschedules and cancel other commitments” to schedule themeeting. Therefore, without a firm commitment from DougC. for one of the two dates he proposed, Waiau refused toreschedule the meeting. Waiau and the IEP team held themeeting without the participation of Doug C. The onlyHorizons Academy staff member on Spencer’s IEP team alsodid not attend. With these key participants absent, the IEP team changedSpencer’s placement from Horizons Academy to theWorkplace Readiness Program at Maui High School. Afterthe meeting, Waiau sent Doug C. the new, completed IEP forhis review. The team held a follow-up IEP meeting onDecember 7 with Doug C. and a staff member from Horizons.At the follow-up meeting, the team reviewed the alreadycompleted IEP “line by line.” Waiau testified that Doug C.provided no substantive input, while Doug C. explained thathe rejected the IEP in its entirety because he was excludedfrom the development process. No changes were made to theIEP during the December 7 meeting. DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 7 The day before the follow-up IEP meeting, Doug C. fileda request for a due process hearing as provided for by theIDEA. He argued, inter alia, that the lack of parentalparticipation in the IEP meeting denied Spencer a FAPE.After a hearing, the administrative hearing officer issued adecision finding that the Department did not deny Spencer aFAPE and dismissed his claims for relief. The district courtaffirmed, holding that plaintiffs “failed to show thatDefendant did not fulfill its statutory duty to ensure that Dougwas afforded an opportunity to participate at the November9, 2010 IEP meeting.” Doug C. timely appealed. II. We review de novo questions of law, including thequestion of whether an IEP provides a free appropriate publiceducation (FAPE). Shapiro,
317 F.3d at 1076
. We reviewthe district court’s findings of fact for clear error, even whenthey are based on an administrative record. Amanda J. v.Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
267 F.3d 877
, 887 (9th Cir. 2001).The deference due to the administrative findings under theIDEA is less than the high standard of deference for judicialreview of most agency actions.
Id.
But we must give “dueweight” to administrative findings, particularly when thefindings are “thorough and careful.” R.B. v. Napa ValleyUnified Sch. Dist.,
496 F.3d 932
, 937 (9th Cir. 2007) (internalquotation marks and citations omitted). III. A. In order to “ensure that the rights of children withdisabilities and parents of such children are protected,”8 DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.
20 U.S.C. § 1400
(d)(1)(B), see also
34 C.F.R. § 300.1
(b), theIDEA guarantees a FAPE to children with disabilities,
20 U.S.C. § 1412
See Also
Doug C. v Hawaii Analysis by Pete Wright, Esq. and Pamela Wright, MA, MSWDoug C. v. Hawaii Dep't of Educ.Doug C., et al. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ., No. 12-15079 (9th Cir. 2013)Doug C. v. State of Hawaii Department of Education(a)(1)(A),
34 C.F.R. § 300.101.4
Whenanalyzing whether an agency provided a student a FAPE, weconduct a two-part inquiry. First, we must consider whether“the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act.”Amanda J.,
267 F.3d at 890
(quoting Rowley,
458 U.S. at
206–07) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, we mustdetermine whether the IEP is “reasonably calculated to enablethe child to receive educational benefits.”
Id.
A state mustmeet both requirements to comply with the obligations of theIDEA. Rowley,
458 U.S. at 207
. Harmless procedural errors do not constitute a denial ofFAPE. L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist.,
556 F.3d 900
,910 (9th Cir. 2008). “‘However, procedural inadequacies thatresult in the loss of educational opportunity, or seriouslyinfringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEPformulation process, clearly result in the denial of FAPE.’”Shapiro,
317 F.3d at 1079
(quoting W.G. v. Bd. of Trs. ofTarget Range Sch. Dist. No. 23,
960 F.2d 1479
, 1484 (9thCir. 1992)). Where a court identifies a procedural violation 4 Hawaii has fully implemented the purposes, guarantees, andprotections of the IDEA into its own regulatory structure. See
Haw. CodeR. §§ 8-60-1
to 8-60-84; see also § 8-60-1(b) (“This chapter shall beconstrued as supplemental to, and in the context of, the Individuals W ithDisabilities Education Act . . . and other federal laws and regulationsrelating to the provision of a free appropriate public education to a studentwith a disability.”). Hawaii’s regulations mirror the language in the IDEAregarding the IDEA’s purposes, the guarantee of a FAPE, and therequirement of parent participation. Compare
Haw. Code R. § 8-60-1
(purposes), with
34 C.F.R. § 300.1
(same);
Haw. Code R. § 8-60-3
(guarantee of FAPE), with
34 C.F.R. § 300.101
(same);
Haw. Code R. § 8
-60-46 (parent participation), with
34 C.F.R. § 300.322
(same). DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 9that denied a student a FAPE, the court need not address thesecond prong.
Id.
Parental participation in the IEP and educationalplacement process is critical to the organization of the IDEA.See
20 U.S.C. § 1414
(d)(1)(B)(i) (requiring the inclusion ofparents on the IEP team);
34 C.F.R. § 300.321
(a)(1) (same);
20 U.S.C. § 1415
(b)(1) (requiring opportunities for parents“to participate in meetings with respect to identification,evaluation and educational placement of the child”). Indeed,the Supreme Court has stressed that the IDEA’s structurerelies upon parental participation to ensure the substantivesuccess of the IDEA in providing quality education todisabled students: [W]e think that the importance Congress attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid. It seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard. We think that the congressional emphasis upon full participation of concerned parties throughout the development of the IEP . . . demonstrates the legislative conviction that adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.10 DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.Rowley,
458 U.S. at
205–06 (citation omitted); see alsoSchaffer v. Weast,
546 U.S. 49
, 53 (2005) (“The core of the[IDEA] . . . is the cooperative process that it establishesbetween parents and schools. . . . The central vehicle for thiscollaboration is the IEP process.”); Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S.305
, 311 (1988) (“Congress repeatedly emphasizedthroughout the [IDEA] the importance and indeed thenecessity of parental participation in both the development ofthe IEP and any subsequent assessments of itseffectiveness.”) (emphasis added). Echoing the Supreme Court, we have held that parentalparticipation safeguards are “[a]mong the most importantprocedural safeguards” in the IDEA and that “[p]roceduralviolations that interfere with parental participation in the IEPformulation process undermine the very essence of theIDEA.” Amanda J.,
267 F.3d at 882, 892
. We haveexplained that parental participation is key to the operation ofthe IDEA for two reasons: “Parents not only represent thebest interests of their child in the IEP development process,they also provide information about the child critical todeveloping a comprehensive IEP and which only they are ina position to know.”
Id. at 882
. In accordance with the foregoing, the regulatoryframework of the IDEA places an affirmative duty onagencies to include parents in the IEP process. The publicagency “responsible for providing education to children withdisabilities,”
34 C.F.R. § 300.33
, is required to “take steps toensure that one or both of the parents of a child with adisability are present at each IEP meeting or are afforded anopportunity to participate” including providing ample noticeand “scheduling the meeting at a mutually agreed on time andplace.”
34 C.F.R. § 300.322
(a). Moreover, if a parent cannot DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 11attend, the agency must offer other methods of participationsuch as video or teleconferencing.
34 C.F.R. §§ 300.322
(c),300.328. Most importantly, a meeting may only be conductedwithout a parent if “the public agency is unable to convincethe parents that they should attend.” § 300.322(d) (emphasisadded). And in that circ*mstance, the agency must keep adetailed record of its attempts to include the parent. Id. InShapiro, we clarified the limited circ*mstances under whicha public agency can hold an IEP meeting without parentalparticipation.
317 F.3d at 1078
. We held that parental“involvement in the ‘creation process’ requires the [agency]to include the [parents in an IEP meeting] unless theyaffirmatively refused to attend.”
Id.
(emphasis added). B. Doug C. did not “affirmatively refuse[] to attend themeeting,”
id.,
nor could it be said that the Department was“unable to convince” him to attend,
34 C.F.R. § 300.322
(d).To the contrary, Doug C. vigorously objected to theDepartment holding an IEP meeting without him and askedthe Department to reschedule the meeting for the followingweek. In response to the Department’s offer to reschedule foreither of the following two days, he agreed to try to attendbut, understandably, could not firmly commit to a meetingdate only one or two days later while he was sick. Despitethe foregoing, the Department went forward with the IEPmeeting without him, over his repeated objections, and, atthat meeting, decided to change Spencer’s educationalplacement for the first time in six years. The Department’sactions simply do not accord with the standard we set forth inShapiro.12 DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. The fact that it may have been frustrating to schedulemeetings with or difficult to work with Doug C. (as theDepartment repeatedly suggests) does not excuse theDepartment’s failure to include him in Spencer’s IEP meetingwhen he expressed a willingness to participate. We haveconsistently held that an agency cannot eschew its affirmativeduties under the IDEA by blaming the parents. SeeAnchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P.,
689 F.3d 1047
, 1055 (9th Cir.2012) (“[P]articipating educational agencies cannot excusetheir failure to satisfy the IDEA’s procedural requirements byblaming the parents.”); see also Target Range,
960 F.2d at1485
(holding that the school district could not blameparents’ choice to leave an IEP meeting for its own failure tocreate an IEP with the participation of the appropriateparties). An agency cannot blame a parent for its failure toensure meaningful procedural compliance with the IDEAbecause the IDEA’s protections are designed to benefit thestudent, not the parent. As we explained in Amanda J.,parental participation is key to providing the student anadequate education because “[a]n IEP which addresses theunique needs of the child cannot be developed if those peoplewho are most familiar with the child’s needs are notinvolved.”
267 F.3d at 892
.5 Because the Department’sobligation is owed to the child, any alleged obstinance ofDoug C. does not excuse the Department’s failure to fulfill itsaffirmative obligation to include Doug C. in the IEP meeting 5 The Department minimizes the importance of parental participationunder the IDEA when it argues that Doug C. would have had little tocontribute at the IEP meeting. The Department is in no position toquestion the value of D oug C.’s input. Congress already answered thatquestion when it prioritized parental participation in the IEP process. DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 13when he expressed a willingness (indeed eagerness) toparticipate, albeit at a later date.6 The Department’s central argument is that it could notaccommodate Doug C.’s request to reschedule because of theimpending annual IEP deadline on November 13. Evenassuming that the annual deadline should somehow trumpparental participation, the Department’s argument fails on thefacts of this case. Waiau, the coordinator of the IEP meeting,testified that he refused to reschedule the meeting for theWednesday or Thursday before the deadline because Doug C.could not firmly commit to either of those dates because ofhis illness, even though Doug C. testified that he said that helikely could attend. Waiau explained that he did not wish todisrupt the other IEP’s members’ schedules without a firmcommitment. This argument may seem reasonable but quickly unravelsbecause, under the IDEA, the attendance of Doug C.,Spencer’s parent, must take priority over other members’attendance for the reasons discussed above. Indeed, a parentcan consent to the absence of other team members at themeeting.
20 U.S.C. § 1414
(d)(1)(C). In Shapiro, we clearlyheld that an agency cannot exclude a parent from an IEPmeeting in order to “prioritize[] its representatives’schedules.”
317 F.3d at 1078
. By refusing to reschedule themeeting for Wednesday or Thursday, Waiau improperlyprioritized the schedules of the other members of the team 6 Of course, if the parent refuses to attend or is entirely unresponsive tothe agency’s requests to meet, the agency has a duty to move forward withthe IEP process. See, e.g., K.D. v. Dep’t of Educ.,
665 F.3d 1110
, 1124(9th Cir. 2011). That is precisely the balance that the IDEA regulationsstrike, as we recognized in Shapiro.14 DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.over the attendance of Doug C. Moreover, Waiau alsotestified that he did not offer Doug C. the option of meetingon the Friday before the annual review deadline because othermembers of the IEP team were not available to meet that day.Once again, the Department improperly prioritized its ownrepresentatives’ schedules and attendance over the attendanceof the parent. Even if the Department’s theory of the case wassupported by the facts, the Department’s argument that itabsolutely could not reschedule the IEP meeting for a dateeven a few days after the annual deadline in order to includeDoug C. is untenable. Waiau’s testimony suggests, and theDepartment’s counsel represented at oral argument, that if theannual deadline passed without a new IEP, services would“lapse.” The district court took a similar position. We rejectthis argument because it is premised on the erroneousassumption that the Department is authorized (let alonerequired) to cease providing services to a student if his annualIEP review is overdue. The IDEA mandates annual review ofa student’s IEP.
20 U.S.C. §1414
(d)(4); see also
34 C.F.R.§ 300.324
(b)(1)(i). However, the Department cites noauthority, nor could it, for the proposition that it cannotprovide any services to a student whose annual review isoverdue. The more difficult question is what a public agency mustdo when confronted with the difficult situation of beingunable to meet two distinct procedural requirements of theIDEA, in this case parental participation and timely annualreview of the IEP. In considering this question, we must keepin mind the purposes of the IDEA: to provide disabledstudents a free appropriate public education and to protect theeducational rights of those students.
20 U.S.C. § 1400
(d). It DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 15is also useful to consider our standard for determining whena procedural error is actionable under the IDEA. We haverepeatedly held that “procedural inadequacies that result inthe loss of educational opportunity or seriously infringe theparents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulationprocess, clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.” Shapiro,
317 F.3d at 1079
; see also Amanda J.,
267 F.3d at 892
.When confronted with the situation of complying with oneprocedural requirement of the IDEA or another, we hold thatthe agency must make a reasonable determination of whichcourse of action promotes the purposes of the IDEA and isleast likely to result in the denial of a FAPE. In reviewing anagency’s action in such a scenario, we will allow the agencyreasonable latitude in making that determination. In this case, the Department was allegedly confrontedwith two options: including Doug C. in the meeting andmissing the IEP annual deadline by several days orproceeding with the IEP meeting without Doug C. butmeeting the annual deadline. As discussed supra, theSupreme Court and this court have both repeatedly stressedthe vital importance of parental participation in the IEPcreation process. We have further held that delays in meetingIEP deadlines do not deny a student a FAPE where they donot deprive a student of any educational benefit. See A.M. v.Monrovia,
627 F.3d 773
, 779 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Whether ornot Defendant exceeded the thirty-day limit, A.M. suffered nodeprivation of educational benefit and therefore has noclaim.”). Under the circ*mstances of this case, theDepartment’s decision to prioritize strict deadline complianceover parental participation was clearly not reasonable. There may, of course, be circ*mstances in whichaccommodating a parent’s schedule would do more harm to16 DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.the student’s interest than proceeding without the parent’spresence at the IEP. For example, in A.M., it was appropriatefor the school to convene an IEP without the parents’participation because the student was new to the school, andtherefore did not have any IEP in place, and the student’sparents were unwilling to reschedule for an entire month afterhaving canceled a scheduled IEP review that was itselfalready almost one month overdue.
627 F.3d at 780
. Wetrust, however, that such circ*mstances will be rare given thecentral role parents have in helping to develop IEPs. Finally, the Department argues that there was no violationhere because the Department held a follow-up IEP meetingwith Doug C. present on December 7. We rejected a similarargument in Shapiro. We held that where an agency violatesthe IDEA by producing a new IEP without the participationof the child’s parents, “[a]fter-the-fact parental involvementis not enough” because the IDEA contemplates parentalinvolvement in the “creation process.” Shapiro,
317 F.3d at1078
. It is uncontested that, at the time of the December 7meeting, the new IEP was already completed and adopted.Therefore, the after-the-fact meeting is not enough to remedythe Department’s decision to hold the initial IEP meeting, inwhich they created the IEP and changed Spencer’s placement,without Doug C. C. We recognize that not every procedural violation resultsin the denial of a FAPE, but procedural errors “that result inthe loss of educational opportunity, or seriously infringe theparents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulationprocess” do. Shapiro,
317 F.3d at 1079
. The failure toinclude Doug C. in the IEP meeting clearly infringed on his DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 17ability to participate in the IEP formulation process. Thatreason alone is cause to conclude that Spencer was denied aFAPE. The procedural violation here also denied Spencer aFAPE for the separate reason that it resulted in the denial ofan educational opportunity. A procedural error results in thedenial of an educational opportunity where, absent the error,there is a “strong likelihood” that alternative educationalpossibilities for the student “would have been betterconsidered.” M.L. v. Federal Way Sch. Dist.,
394 F.3d 634
,657 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J. concurring in part andconcurring in the judgment). Thus, an IEP team’s failure toproperly consider an alternative educational plan can result ina lost educational opportunity even if the student cannotdefinitively demonstrate that his placement would have beendifferent but for the procedural error. See
id.
Here, there isa strong likelihood that the benefits of placement at HorizonsAcademy, Doug C.’s preferred placement for his son, wouldhave been more thoroughly considered if Doug C. had beenpresent at the meeting. It is particularly likely that the meritsof continuing Spencer’s placement at Horizons Academywere not adequately considered in light of the fact that theIEP team member from the Academy was also absent. Therefore, both because (1) Doug C.’s opportunity toparticipate was seriously infringed and (2) the proceduralviolation denied Spencer an educational opportunity bycausing the merits of his placement at Horizon Academy toreceive insufficient consideration, the Department deniedSpencer a FAPE.18 DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. IV. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’sjudgment and remand. On remand, the district court mustdetermine whether Doug C. is entitled to reimbursem*nt forthe costs of maintaining Spencer at Horizons Academy duringthe administrative and judicial review proceedings. Parentswho place their children in private schools pending reviewproceedings under the IDEA are entitled to reimbursem*nt if(1) the public placement violated the IDEA and (2) “theprivate school placement was proper under the Act.”Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four,
510 U.S. at 15
. Spencer’splacement at the Workplace Readiness Program at Maui HighSchool violated the IDEA because the placement was a resultof the November 9 IEP meeting. Neither the district courtnor the administrative hearing officer considered whetherHorizons was a proper placement under the Act. Therefore,upon remand, the district court is directed to consider whetherSpencer’s placement at Horizons Academy was proper underthe Act and, if so, order reimbursem*nt for Spencer’s privateplacement during the course of the administrative and judicialproceedings. Id.;
20 U.S.C. § 1415
(i)(2)(C)(iii) (giving adistrict court the power to “grant such relief as [it] determinesis appropriate”). We note that a parent’s decision to place his child in aprivate school is “proper” so long as the school the parentselects “provides educational instruction specially designedto meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supportedby such services as are necessary to permit the child tobenefit from instruction.” C.B. ex rel. Baquerizo v. GardenGrove Unified Sch. Dist.,
635 F.3d 1155
, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This standardis met even if the private school provides “some, but not all” DOUG C. V . STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 19of the students educational needs; the placement need not“maximize the[] child’s potential.”
Id.
(internal quotationmarks, citation, and italics omitted). Where, as here, theprivate school selected by the parent is the same school thatthe child has previously attended for several years under IEPsthat have been approved by all parties, we think it highlyunlikely that the placement does not represent a “proper”placement.7 Nonetheless, we remand to permit the districtcourt to consider the question. The district court may remandthis issue to the state hearing officer to decide in the firstinstance. REVERSED and REMANDED. 7 Indeed, under the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, a child is typicallyentitled to remain in his previous educational setting throughout the courseof any administrative and judicial proceedings. See
20 U.S.C. § 1415
(j).Here, however, Doug C. has not appealed the district court’s denial of hismotion for a stay put order, so we do not address whether he is entitled toreimbursem*nt on that basis.
